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Previous studies have widely shown that self-esteem modulates the attention bias
towards social rejection or emotion-related information. However, little is known about
the influences of self-esteem on attention bias towards self-relevant stimuli. We aimed
to investigate neural correlates that underlie the modulation effect of self-esteem on
self-relevant processing. Event-related potentials (ERP) were recorded for subjects’ own
names and close others’ names (the names of their friends) while subjects performed
a three-stimulus oddball task. The results showed larger P2 amplitudes for one’s own
name than for close-other’s name in the low self-esteem group, whereas this P2 effect
were not observed in the high self-esteem group. In addition, one’s own name elicited
equivalent N250 amplitudes and larger P3 amplitudes compared with close-other’s name
in both high and low self-esteem groups. However, no interaction effects were observed
between self-esteem and self-relevant processing in the N250 and P3 components.
Thus, we found that the modulation effects of self-esteem on self-relevant processing
occurred at the early P2 stage, but not at the later N250 and P3 stages. These findings
reflect that individuals with low self-esteem demonstrate automatic attention towards
their own names.
Keywords: low self-esteem, high self-esteem, subject’s own name, ERP, P2, P3
Introduction
Self-esteem is a personality variable that refers to the degree to which one values and accepts
himself or herself, and reflects one’s attitude or overall affective bias towards his or her own
value (Rosenberg, 1965; Pruessner et al., 2005). Self-esteem has a pervasive and powerful
effect on human cognition. Specifically, considerable studies have reported that self-esteem
could modulate attentional bias for social rejection or emotional information. For example,
a behavioral study has shown that people with low self-esteem exhibit significantly more
interference in rejection words than in acceptance words during a rejection stroop task,
whereas no such difference was observed in high self-esteem individuals. People with
low self-esteem show an obvious attentional bias towards rejection-related information,
which disturbed the process of naming the color of words (Dandeneau and Baldwin,
2004). During an attention shifting task, Li et al. (2012) examined the neurophysiological
response to rejection cues in individuals with low and high self-esteem and found
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that P2 amplitudes elicited by social rejection were larger for
individuals with low self-esteem than those with high self-
esteem (Li et al., 2012). Using a visual-probe task, Li and Yang
(2013) found that individuals with low self-esteem demonstrated
attentional bias toward happy and angry faces indexed by
enhanced P1 and N1 activity, whereas such attentional bias was
not observed in high self-esteem individuals (Li and Yang, 2013).
As described above, social rejection or emotional
information are preferentially attended by low self-esteem
individuals compared with high self-esteem individuals.
Individuals with low self-esteem frequently encounter
social rejection or negative evaluation during their lives
(Harter, 1983, 1993). Thus, they become more sensitive to
rejection-related information and care excessively about the
evaluation of others. This enhanced sensitivity to negative
information in low self-esteem individuals may further
strengthen their feelings of low self-worth. However, studies
that investigate the relationship between self-esteem and
attentional processing focus mostly on the attentional bias
towards feedback from others or external stimuli, such as
evaluation of others, social rejection, and external emotional
events.
It is known that individuals with low self-esteem valued
themselves quite differently from those with high self-esteem.
For example, when individuals with low self-esteem experience
failure, they would more likely blame themselves, negatively
evaluate their abilities, and establish association between
negative events and themselves. Thus, low self-esteem
individuals may also demonstrate attentional bias towards
self-relevant information. More recently, some studies have
shown an interaction among self-esteem, self-relevance, and
emotion valence (Zhang et al., 2013; Yang et al., 2014). For
example, Zhang et al. (2013) found that individuals with low
self-esteem demonstrated more pronounced P2 latencies in
processing negative-low self-relevant words compared with
positive-low self-relevant words, whereas such effect was not
observed in individuals with high self-esteem (Zhang et al.,
2013). Yang et al. (2014) also found a significantly negative
correlation between self-esteem scores and P2 latencies in
processing negative-high self-relevant words, which suggests
that individuals with a lower level of self-esteem would divert
more attentional resources to highly negative self-relevant
words (Yang et al., 2014). However, these studies mainly
focused on the emotional (positive vs. negative) aspect of
self-processing (Zhang et al., 2013; Yang et al., 2014). The
cognitive and emotional aspects of self-referential processing
are two essential components of self-reflection (Moran et al.,
2006). Thus, we focused on the cognitive (self-relevance
vs. non-self-relevance) aspect of self-processing, using the
event-related potential (ERP) technique to investigate whether
self-esteem could modulate attentional bias towards self-relevant
information.
Given that one’s own name captures very important personal
significance in everyday life, the present study selected the
names of the participants as the self-relevant stimuli, and
the names of theirs friends as familiar but non-self-relevant
stimuli. To set up an experimental situation similar to real-life
settings, where the occurrence of one’s own name is often
unexpected (e.g., detecting one’s own name at a cocktail party),
we used a three-stimulus oddball task, in which participants
were asked to detect a rare target; the experimental stimuli
(participant’s own name, the name of the participant’s friend)
were interspersed unexpectedly in the stream of standard
and target trials as distractor stimuli (Polich, 2007). Research
regarding self-relevant processing has widely reported that one’s
own name can attract attentional resources more preferentially
and automatically compared with other names. For example,
early studies on the ‘‘cocktail party’’ phenomenon have shown
that people could sometimes detect their own names even in
the absence of attention, whereas other messages were not
detected in this manner (Moray, 1959; Wood and Cowan,
1995).
ERP studies have shown that larger P2 amplitudes were
elicited by the names owned by the individuals than by other
names, which reflects the autonomic and fast recruitment of
attentional resource towards self-names (Chen et al., 2011; Hu
et al., 2011). Moreover, larger P3 amplitudes were also elicited
by self-names than by other names, which shows the voluntary,
top-down controlled attentional processing and the cognitive
evaluation of self-relevant information (Berlad and Pratt, 1995;
Perrin et al., 2005; Zhao et al., 2009; Tacikowski and Nowicka,
2010; Chen et al., 2011, 2013). Taken together, these ERP findings
suggest that attention bias for one’s own name occurs at each
step of the information processing stream, from early autonomic
attention to voluntarily controlled attention at a later stage.
Thus, we further aimed to determine whether the modulating
effect of self-esteem on self-name processing occurred at
the early autonomic attention stage, or at the later stage
of controlled attention, or both. Previous studies suggest
that individuals with low self-esteem demonstrated greater
attentional bias for social rejection, emotional stimuli, or self-
relevant emotional stimuli compared with individuals with high
self-esteem (Dandeneau and Baldwin, 2004; Li et al., 2012; Li
and Yang, 2013; Zhang et al., 2013; Yang et al., 2014). Based
on these studies, we hypothesized that individuals with low
self-esteem would also demonstrate greater attentional bias for
their own names at the early automatic stage of information
processing indicated by enhanced P2 amplitudes, or at the
late controlled stage indicated by enhanced P3 amplitudes or
both.
Materials and Methods
Participants
A total of 252 undergraduate students were recruited to fill out
the Rosenberg self-esteem (RSE) scale (Rosenberg, 1965). The
RSE is a 4-point scale (1 = ‘‘strongly disagree’’ to 4 = ‘‘strongly
agree’’) with 10 items. The previous study found that the eighth
item of the scale (‘‘I wish I could respect myself more’’) show
a low correlation with other items for Chinese participants
(Zhou and Wang, 2005). Thus, this item was excluded when
computing the scores. The Cronbach’s α in the present study
is 0.83. Based on their scores, individuals who scored in the
upper 15th percentile of the distribution were categorized as
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the high self-esteem group, and who scored in the lower 15th
percentile of the distribution were categorized as the low self-
esteem group. From these groups, we invited 15 participants
with low-esteem (five men, 10 women; 18–21 years, mean
age = 19.33, SD = 0.82) and 15 participants with high-esteem
(six men, nine women; 18–22 years, mean age = 19.6, SD = 1.06)
to attend the electrophysiological study. The mean score for
the low self-esteem group was 21.73 (SD = 1.44, from 18
to 25), and that for the high self-esteem group was 33.73
(SD = 1.58 from 30 to 36). All participants were healthy, right-
handed, with normal or corrected-to-normal vision, and free
from any neurological dysfunctions. The local review board for
human participant research approved the experimental protocol.
All participants joined the study with informed consents and
compensation.
Stimuli
During the three-stimulus oddball task, we used a small circle
(1.43◦ × 1.43◦) as the target stimulus, and a big circle (2.29◦ ×
2.29◦) as the standard stimulus. The names of the participants
and the names of their friends were used as distracters. The close
others are participants’ friends, who are participants’ classmates
studying in the same university as them. All participants and their
paired friends were matched in age and gender, and knowing
each other for about 2 years. The names were presented visually
as two-character (1.15◦ × 2.29◦) or three-character (1.15◦ ×
3.44◦) Chinese words, with the length also matched between
these two name-categories.
Experimental Procedure
About 3 weeks after the self-esteem assessment, participants
attended the ERP experiment. Participants conducted 25
practice trials before the formal experiment. During the
formal experiment, the big circle was presented 420 times
(approximately 70%), the small circle 60 times (approximately
10%), and each set of name stimuli 60 times (10%). Each trial was
initiated using a 300-ms presentation of a small black cross on the
gray computer screen. Afterwards, a gray screen was presented
with a duration ranging from 500–800 ms. Subsequently, one
of the four categories of stimuli was presented for 300 ms. The
task of the participants was to detect the small circle and to
press the J key on the keyboard with their right index finger
if the small circle was presented. No response was required for
other stimuli. Each experimental stimulus was followed by a
gray screen for 1200 ms. There were totally six blocks, and the
sequence of stimuli was randomized across conditions in each
block. Subjects were allowed to rest for several minutes after each
block.
Electroencephalography (EEG) Recordings
Electroencephalography (EEG) was recorded from 64 scalp sites
using tin electrodes mounted in an elastic cap (Brain Products),
with the references on the left and right mastoids (average
mastoid reference; Luck, 2005) and a ground electrode on the
medial frontal aspect. Horizontal electrooculograms (EOGs)
were recorded at the right and left orbital rim. Vertical EOGs
were recorded supra-orbitally and infra-orbitally at the left eye.
Electrode impedance was maintained below 5 kΩ. EEG and
EOG activity was amplified with a dc ∼100 Hz bandpass and
continuously sampled at 500 Hz/channel. EEG data, time-locked
to the onset of the experimental stimuli, were epoched from
−200 to 1000 ms, and baseline corrected using the prestimulus
200 ms time interval. ERP trials with EOG artifacts (mean
EOG voltage exceeding ±80 V), or peak-to-peak deflection
exceeding ±80 V was excluded from averaging. Artifact-free
ERP trials were averaged separately for each experimental
condition.
Because the previous studies have suggested a lateralization
of visual self-recognition (Turk et al., 2002; Uddin et al., 2005;
Ma and Han, 2010; Heinisch et al., 2011), we examined the
caudality and laterality effects, by selecting the following 15
electrode sites for statistical analysis: F3, FC3, C3, CP3, P3 (five
left sites); Fz, FCz, Cz, CPz, Pz (five midline sites); and F4, FC4,
C4, CP4, P4 (five right sites). As shown in Figure 1, prominent
N1 (80–120 ms), P2 (150–250 ms), N250 (260–330 ms) and
P3 (350–500 ms) components were elicited during all three
conditions. The peak amplitudes and latencies of the N1, P2,
N250 and P3 components were measured and analyzed at their
corresponding time intervals. A four-way repeated measures
analysis of variance (ANOVA) was performed on all measured
amplitudes and latencies for each component. ANOVA factors
were the self-esteem group (two levels: low and high self-esteem
groups), the name type (two levels: one’s own name and close-
other’s name), laterality (three levels: the left, midline and right
sites) and caudality (three levels for the N1, P2 and N250
components: frontal, frontocentral and central; five levels for
the P3 component: frontal, frontocentral, central, centroparietal,
and parietal). The ERP data were analyzed by the software
of Brain Products Analyzer, and the statistical analysis was
conducted by the SPSS 16.0. The degrees of freedom of the
F-ratio were corrected according to the Greenhouse-Geisser
method.
Results
N1
The ANOVA for amplitudes of N1 showed that neither the
main effect for name type (F(1,28) = 2.46, p = 0.13, η2p = 0.08)
nor its interaction with self-esteem group reached significance
(F(1,28) = 0.005, p = 0.94, η2p = 0.00; see Tables 1, 2). Furthermore,
the main effect of laterality was significant (F(2,56) = 11.24,
p < 0.001, η2p = 0.29). Post hoc comparisons with bonferroni
correction (the same afterwards) showed that the scalp midline
regions (−2.8 µV) showed larger N1 amplitudes than the right
lateralized (−2.18 µV, p< 0.001) and left lateralized (−2.42 µV,
p = 0.05) regions. In addition, neither the main effect for name
type nor its interaction with self-esteem group was significant on
N1 latencies (ps> 0.1).
P2
TheANOVA for amplitudes of P2 demonstrated significantmain
effects of name type (F(1,28) = 6.81, p = 0.014, η2p = 0.2) and
laterality (F(2,56) = 25.53, p < 0.0001, η2p = 0.48; see Figure 1).
One’s own name (5.89 µV) elicited larger P2 amplitudes than
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FIGURE 1 | Averaged ERPs at Fz, Cz and CPz to one’s own (black lines) and friend’s (red lines) names for participants with low self-esteem (left
panels) and high self-esteem (right panels).
TABLE 1 | The amplitudes of N1, P2, N250 and P3 components in the self
and close other conditions during low and high self-esteem groups
(µV, M ± SE).
Low self-esteem group High self-esteem group
Self Close other Self Close other
N1 −2.08 ± 0.3 −2.57 ± 0.34 −2.34 ± 0.3 −2.88 ± 0.34
P2 5.93 ± 0.69 4.61 ± 0.67 5.84 ± 0.69 5.76 ± 0.67
N250 −1.18 ± 1.2 −1.51 ± 1.23 1.68 ± 1.2 1.55 ± 1.23
P3 7.94 ± 1.66 5.97 ± 1.5 12.92 ± 1.66 10.52 ± 1.5
close-other’s name (5.18 µV). Post hoc comparisons showed that
the scalp midline regions (6.56 µV) showed larger P2 amplitudes
than the right lateralized (5.18µV, p< 0.0001) and left lateralized
(4.86µV, p< 0.0001) regions.Moreover, the interaction between
name type and self-esteem group was significant (F(1,28) = 5.23,
p= 0.03, η2p = 0.16). One’s own name elicited larger P2 amplitudes
than close-other’s name (F(1,28) = 13.68, p = 0.002, η2p = 0.49)
in the low self-esteem group, whereas no significant difference
was observed between one’s own name and close-other’s name
(F(1,28) = 0.05, p = 0.83, η2p = 0.003) in the high self-esteem
group (see Table 2; Figure 2). These results indicated that self-
esteem modulated the self-relevant effect at the early P2 stage.
In addition, neither the main effect for name type nor its
interaction with self-esteem group was significant on P2 latencies
(ps> 0.05).
N250
The ANOVA for N250 amplitudes showed that neither the
main effect for name type (F(1,28) = 0.75, p = 0.4, η2p = 0.03)
nor its interaction with the self-esteem group was significant
(F(1,28) = 0.13, p = 0.72, η2p = 0.005). Furthermore, the main
effect of frontality was significant (F(2,56) = 65.43, p < 0.0001,
η2p = 0.7). The scalp frontal regions (−1.48 µV) showed
more negative N250 waves than the frontal-central (0.34 µV,
TABLE 2 | The results of ANOVA for the amplitudes of N1, P2, N250 and P3 components.
Name type Self-esteem Name type* self-esteem Name type* self-esteem* audality Name type* self-esteem* laterality
F P F P F P F P F P
N1 2.46 0.13 0.81 0.38 0.005 0.94 0.32 0.69 1.2 0.31
P2 6.81 0.014 0.33 0.57 5.23 0.03 2.51 0.11 1.81 0.17
N250 0.75 0.4 3.06 0.09 1.13 0.72 0.39 0.62 0.01 0.98
P3 16.64 0.0001 4.81 0.037 0.16 0.69 2.12 0.12 0.11 0.89
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FIGURE 2 | Topographical maps of voltage amplitudes for one’s own
name minus close-other’s name difference ERPs at the P2 and P3
components for participants with low self-esteem (left panels) and
high self-esteem (right panels).
p < 0.001) and central (1.55 µV, p < 0.001) regions. In
addition, neither the main effect for name type nor its interaction
with self-esteem group was significant on N250 latencies
(ps> 0.05).
P3
The ANOVA for amplitudes of P3 demonstrated the significant
main effects of name type (F(1,28) = 16.64, p < 0.0001, η2p = 0.37)
and frontality (F(4,112) = 10.71, p = 0.001, η2p = 0.28; see
Figure 1). The names of the subjects (10.43 µV) elicited larger
P3 amplitudes than the names of their friends (8.24 µV).
Post hoc tests showed that the P3 amplitudes were largest at
the central-parietal (11.11 µV) regions and smallest at the
frontal regions (6.83 µV). In addition, the main effect of
name type was also significant on P3 latencies (F(1,28) = 4.25,
p = 0.049, η2p = 0.13), with shorter P3 latencies for one’s own
name (402.58 ms) than for the close-other’s name (414.82 ms).
However, the interaction between self-esteem group and name
type was not significant for P3 amplitudes (F(1,28) = 0.16, p = 0.69,
η2p = 0.006; Figure 2) and latencies (F(1,28) = 0.000, p = 0.98,
η2p = 0.000).
Additional Analyses
To further test whether the P2 component was a valid index
for the effect of self-esteem on self-relevant processing, we ran
the correlation analysis between the self-esteem scores and the
differential P2 or P3 amplitudes to the one’s own and close-
other’s names (P2 or P3 amplitudes to one’s own name minus
P2 or P3 amplitudes to close-other’s name). The results showed
a significant negative correlation between the self-esteem scores
and the differential P2 amplitudes to one’s own and close-other’s
names (r = −0.41, p = 0.023, df = 28). However, we failed to
observe significant correlation between the self-esteem scores
and the differential P3 amplitudes to one’s own and close-other’s
names (r = 0.12, p = 0.54, df = 28).
Moreover, the P2 and P3 amplitudes were entered into a
three-way repeated-measures ANOVAs with the Name type
(one’s own name and close-other’s name) and Component
(P2, P3) as within-subjects factors, and the self-esteem score
as the continuous between-subjects variable.The results showed
a significant three-way interaction effect among name type,
component and self-esteem score (F(1,28) = 4.89, p = 0.035,
η2p = 0.15). The subsequent analysis showed a significant
interaction between name type and self-esteem score for P2
component (F(1,28) = 5.79, p = 0.023, η2p = 0.17). However, this
two-way interaction was not significant for the P3 component
(F(1,28) = 0.4, p = 0.54, η2p = 0.01).
Thus, these results taken together indicated that the P2
component was sensitive to the modulation effect of self-esteem
on self-relevant processing rather than the P3 component.
Discussion
The present study examines the modulating effect of self-
esteem on self-name processing using ERP measures and further
determines whether the modulating effect occurs at the early
autonomic attention stage, later stage of controlled attention,
or both. The findings showed that individuals with low self-
esteem demonstrated larger P2 amplitudes in response to their
own names compared with the names of their friends. No such
P2 difference was observed in individuals with high self-esteem.
However, no self-esteem by name type interaction effect was
observed for P3 amplitudes, although individuals with both
low and high self-esteem demonstrated larger P3 amplitudes in
response to their own names than to the names of their friends.
These findings showed that the modulating effect of self-esteem
on self-name processing occurred at the early P2 stage, but not
on the later P3 stage.
The N1 component represents the early visual processing
of stimuli (Luck and Hillyard, 2000; Vogel and Luck, 2000).
In the present study, no different N1 amplitudes and latencies
were observed between one’s own and close-other names in
individuals with low and high self-esteem perhaps because the
name stimuli are in Chinese characters, which are equal in size,
word length, and complexity. Thus, the early visual processing
was similar during these name conditions (Chen et al., 2011,
2013).
The P2 component is considered a neural index of automatic
attention responses to highly salient stimuli and larger P2
amplitudes reflect enhanced recruitment of attentional resources
(Karayanidis and Michie, 1996; Carretié et al., 2001, 2004,
2011; Meixner and Rosenfeld, 2010). Previous ERP studies
have also found that individuals with low self-esteem tend
to easily direct their attention to emotional stimuli, such
as social rejection and negatively self-relevant stimuli, and
demonstrated enhanced P2 amplitudes or prolonged P2 latencies
for processing these emotion-related stimuli (Li et al., 2012;
Yang et al., 2012, 2014; Li and Yang, 2013; Zhang et al.,
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2013). Consistent with these studies, the present study found
that individuals with low self-esteem demonstrated larger P2
amplitudes in response to their own names than to close others’
names, but individuals with high self-esteem did not show
such effect. The occurrence of our own name in everyday life
may indicate that some significant events (such as criticism,
praise, or a warning) will happen to us (Tacikowski et al.,
2014). Thus, our findings showed that low self-esteem individuals
demonstrated greater mobilization of attentional resources
toward their own names, which may be attributed to the
important significance conveyed by the occurrence of their own
names.
In addition, some inconsistences existed in previous studies
regarding whether the early P2 component could be modulated
by self-relevance. Some studies showed that self-relevant stimuli
(e.g., the name of the subject) elicited larger P2 amplitudes
than self-irrelevant stimuli (e.g., the names of their father,
famous people, or strangers) (Chen et al., 2011, 2013; Hu
et al., 2011; Fan et al., 2013). However, Tacikowski et al.
(2014) found that no significant differences were present on
P2 amplitudes between participants’ own names and the names
of their friends (Tacikowski et al., 2014). Su et al. (2010) also
found that the hand of the participant and the hand of a
stranger elicited equivalent P2 amplitudes and latencies (Su
et al., 2010). The inconsistent results observed in these studies
may be attributed to the different experimental stimuli and
paradigm used; the effects of stimulus familiarity and task-
relevance should be considered in future studies regarding self-
processing (Su et al., 2010; Tacikowski et al., 2014). We observed
that individuals with low self-esteem demonstrated larger P2
amplitudes for their own names than for close others’ names,
whereas no significant difference was observed in individuals
with high self-esteem. Thus, self-esteem as a personality variable
should also be considered when investigating the self-relevant
effect.
Previous studies suggested that N250 appears at latencies of
approximately 200–300 ms; this value varied with familiarity and
was larger in familiar faces and names (Schweinberger et al.,
1995; Herzmann et al., 2004; Zhao et al., 2011). In the present
study, one’s own and close-other’s names elicited equivalent
N250 amplitudes and latencies in high and low self-esteem
groups. This finding may suggest that the familiarity is similar
for both types of names.
Moreover, we found that individuals with high and low self-
esteem demonstrated larger P3 amplitudes for their own names
than for close others’ names. It has been widely reported that
the P3 component could be modulated by one’s own name
(Gray et al., 2004; Zhao et al., 2009; Tacikowski and Nowicka,
2010; Chen et al., 2011, 2013; Tacikowski et al., 2011; Fan et al.,
2013). P3, a positive component that appears approximately
300 ms after the stimulus onset, was related to multiple cognitive
functions, including top-down controlled attentional processes,
cognitive evaluation, and the updating of representations in
working memory (Donchin, 1981; Donchin and Coles, 1988;
Polich, 2007). Thus, our findings regarding lager P3 amplitudes
for one’s own name could be explained by the fact that one’s
own name garners a larger amount of attentional and cognitive
resources and evokes enhanced motivational responses than
close-other’s name. However, the size of self-relevant effect,
which is indicated by the amplitude difference between one’s
own and close-other names, was equivalent for high and low
self-esteem individuals. Thus, the modulation effect of self-
esteem on self-relevant processing did not occur at the late P3
stage.
It should be noted that the present study only measured
the explicit self-esteem, and failed to take into account the
factor of implicit self-esteem. Considerable studies have used
various methodologies such as the implicit association test (IAT),
Go/Nogo association (GNAT) and name letter evaluations to
explore the implicit self-esteem (Greenwald and Banaji, 1995;
Greenwald and Farnham, 2000; Greenwald et al., 2002; Wu et al.,
2014; Grundy et al., 2015). Moreover, the implicit and explicit
self-esteem have been considered to be different constructs, and
they might have different influences on cognitive processing or
social behavior (Greenwald and Banaji, 1995; Bosson et al., 2000;
Greenwald and Farnham, 2000). Thus, it is necessary for future
studies to determine the influences of implicit self-esteem on self-
relevant processing.
Moreover, it has been suggested that self-esteem is a self-
conception with the characteristics of culture, and should
be related to culture-related variables such as self-construal
(Markus and Kitayama, 1991a). Specifically, both theoretical
and empirical accounts revealed that East Asians with a
dominant interdependent self-construal tended to show weaker
self-enhancement or lower self-esteem than Westerners with a
dominant independent self-construal (Markus and Kitayama,
1991b; Feather andMcKee, 1993; Heine et al., 1999; Singelis et al.,
1999; Heine and Renshaw, 2002). Previous studies investigating
the influences of self-esteem on cognitive processing usually
didn’t take account of the factor of self-construal (Dandeneau
and Baldwin, 2004; Li et al., 2012; Li and Yang, 2013; Zhang
et al., 2013; Yang et al., 2014). Moreover, our correlation analysis
showed that the self-relevant effect, indicated by the P2 difference
between self-relevant and non-self-relevant conditions, was
significantly correlated with the level of self-esteem. However,
it would be interesting and necessary to introduce the culture-
related variables such as self-construal into future studies of
self-esteem, especially explore the effects of self-esteem on
cognition within a cultural neuroscience framework (Han et al.,
2013).
Taken together, in addition to the modulation effect of
self-esteem on attention bias towards social rejection cues,
emotional events, and emotional aspect of self-relevant stimuli
reported in the previous studies, the present study further
showed that self-esteem could modulate attention bias towards
one’s own name. This modulation effect occurred at the early
automatic attention stage as indexed by the P2 component,
but not at the late stage of top-down controlled processing
as indexed by the P3 component. These findings may suggest
that self-esteem can affect our self-perception in an implicit
or unconscious manner. Future studies should adopt other
self-relevant stimuli and experimental tasks to investigate the
modulation effect of self-esteem on self-processing, particularly
using high-spatial-resolution fMRI to unravel neural substrates
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that mediate this modulation effect, and how these neural
activities relate to their psychological well-being. It still
should be noted that the factor of intimate relationship
should be considered and is necessary to make a quantified
measurement of intimate relationship when investigating the
cognitive and neural representations of self and close others
(Ma and Han, 2010, 2012; Wang et al., 2012; Sui et al.,
2013).
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